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Abstract—More than a dozen wireless technologies are used by
air traffic communication systems during different flight phases.
From a conceptual perspective, all of them are insecure as
security was never part of their design. Recent contributions from
academic and hacking communities have exploited this inherent
vulnerability to demonstrate attacks on some of these technolo-
gies. However, not all of these contributions have resonated widely
within aviation circles. At the same time, the security community
lacks certain aviation domain knowledge, preventing aviation
authorities from giving credence to their findings.
In this survey, we aim to reconcile the view of the security
community and the perspective of aviation professionals con-
cerning the safety of air traffic communication technologies. To
achieve this, we first provide a systematization of the applications
of wireless technologies upon which civil aviation relies. Based
on these applications, we comprehensively analyze vulnerabilities
and existing attacks. We further survey the existing research
on countermeasures and categorize it into approaches that
are applicable in the short term and research of secure new
technologies deployable in the long term.
Since not all of the required aviation knowledge is codified in
academic publications, we additionally examine existing aviation
standards and survey 242 international aviation experts. Besides
their domain knowledge, we also analyze the awareness of
members of the aviation community concerning the security of
wireless systems and collect their expert opinions on the potential
impact of concrete attack scenarios using these technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Air traffic control (ATC) is the backbone of what is
arguably the key means of personal transport in the modern
world. As the traffic load continues to grow dramatically, ATC
has to manage ever more aircraft. Large European airports,
such as London Heathrow, experience spikes of more than
1,500 daily take-offs and landings, and industry forecasts
predict that world-wide flight movements will double by 2030.
Additionally, with the growing adoption of unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) technology for civil applications, we can expect
a further boost in air traffic in the coming years.
Historically, ATC and its associated wireless communi-
cations technologies are rooted in the military. Most of the
improvements in communication, navigation and surveillance
(CNS) technologies are direct results of wartime developments
[1]. For instance, surveillance radar systems and navigation
functions which were developed originally for the armed forces
were later adopted for civilian aviation. This change of purpose
and application also shifted the threat models affecting these
wireless technologies considerably. Where the military can
often also rely on secrecy, security through obscurity, and
superior proprietary technologies to prevail in an arms race,
the requirements in a civil setting of worldwide collaboration
are different. In this environment, a pure security by design
approach, such as the protection of critical wireless communi-
cation through standard cryptographic countermeasures, would
be highly preferable. Unfortunately, in the slow-changing in-
dustry of aviation, such a radical change in security approaches
is not currently on the horizon (and arguably not easy to
introduce at this point in time).
The civil aviation community emphasizes safety and has a
sound and steadily improving safety record. Security, however,
is not safety, and requires a different approach. While we en-
countered many helpful and interested people and institutions
in aviation during our investigation, the prevalent feeling is still
“Why is security needed? Is air traffic communication not safe
currently?”. Indeed, historically, few if any incidents have been
recorded where communication technologies were maliciously
exploited to cause distress to aircraft. Consequently, even re-
cently developed aviation technologies that make the shift from
traditional radar to modern digital communication networks do
not include security by design in their specifications; instead
the systems rely almost exclusively on redundancy.
However, with the widespread availability of cheap and
powerful tools such as software-defined radios (SDR), the
aviation community lost the considerable technical advantage
protecting its communication in the past. This is illustrated by
the recent proliferation of reports about potential cyberattacks
on wireless ATC technologies. High-profile incidents, such
as the case of hijacked emergency signals [2] or alleged
military exercises causing aircraft to vanish from European
radar screens [3], created a lot of speculation in the media
about the potential impact of insecure technologies on the
safety of air traffic [4], [5]. Disregarding the accuracy of
individual reports, these speculations are directly caused by
the fact that such attacks are potentially feasible, which has
been proven recently by hackers [6], [7] and the academic
community [8]. Much further research has been conducted on
the security of newly-developed ATC protocols, and the digital
avionics systems installed in modern aircraft [9]–[11].
Meanwhile, following these revelations, accusations of
overblown media reporting of cybersecurity issues have been
made by members of the aviation community. Some claim the
impossibility of the cited hacks of aircraft IT systems in the
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real world [12], [13], or doubt the impact of attacks on wireless
air traffic communication systems in practice due to the widely
deployed checks and balances common to aviation [14].
These instances show that, unfortunately, many who un-
derstand wireless security, do not have appropriate aviation
expertise. Likewise, many stakeholders in aviation know the
processes and procedures but do not realize the severity of
modern cybersecurity issues. Our work aims to integrate these
colliding perspectives in a realistic model and inform future
discussion about wireless security in aviation.
There is much existing work in the wider area of aviation
cyber security; in Section VI we survey those articles that relate
to the wireless communications technologies on which we
focus in the present work. For an introduction to the topic, the
reader is referred to Sampigethaya et al., who focus on future
“e-enabled” aircraft communications and their security [9] and
highlight the challenges and problems of these modern cyber-
physical systems [15]. Likewise, [16] surveyed the security
of future on-board and off-board avionics systems, relating
not only to wireless ATC communication but to the electronic
distribution of software and air health management.
Contributions
The goal of this paper is to consolidate academic and
hacker security knowledge, information from aviation technol-
ogy standards, and expert opinions from the aviation domain,
both detailed and aggregated. We systematize the collected
knowledge along three dimensions:
• We provide a systematization of all relevant wireless tech-
nologies considering their applications in aviation: air traf-
fic control, information services, and navigation aids. We
explain their usage within the aviation system, detail their
technical features, and discuss their safety impact.
• We systematically integrate knowledge from the academic
and hacker communities with technology standards to an-
alyze the security of these applications, providing a com-
plete overview over their vulnerabilities, existing attacks,
and countermeasures. We further categorize all proposed
countermeasures according to their applicability time frame.
• As not all of the required aviation knowledge is currently
codified publicly, we additionally survey 242 international
aviation experts to capitalize on their domain knowledge. We
further examine the awareness of the aviation community
concerning wireless security and collect expert opinions on
the potential safety impact of attacks on these technologies.
Our systematization identifies discrepancies between stake-
holders and provides an integrated view of aviation communi-
cations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first investi-
gation of this scale, including knowledge from more than 200
participants from different aviation groups, over 400 comments
on the topic of cyberattacks, a practical assessment of safety
impact and security features of all relevant technologies, and
an evaluation of nine concrete hypothetical attack scenarios.
We highlight the urgent need to increase knowledge and
awareness of the discussed problems within both communities
in order to improve short- and long-term wireless air traffic
security. In particular, we argue that without awareness among
professionals and entities in aviation of the criticality of
Abb. Full Name
Air Traffic Control
VHF Voice (Very High Frequency)
PSR Primary Surveillance Radar
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar (Mode A/C/S)
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
CPDLC Controller–Pilot Data Link Communications
MLAT Multilateration
Information Services
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
FIS-B Flight Information System-Broadcast
TIS-B Traffic Information System-Broadcast
Navigational Aids
GPS Global Positioning System
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range
ILS Instrument Landing System
NDB Non-directional Beacon
DME Distance-measuring Equipment
TABLE I: Short-handles and full names of aviation communication
technologies, systematized into applications.
existing vulnerabilities, the necessary change will likely not
come about before a fatal real-world accident occurs.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Section
II gives an overview of air traffic communication and our
adversarial model. Section III provides the background to our
survey. Section IV analyzes the technologies of ATC, infor-
mation services, and navigation aids, including their security.
In Section V, we discuss the aviation experts’ evaluation of
concrete attack scenarios. Section VI categorizes the existing
countermeasures and identifies current directions in aviation
security research. Section VII concludes this work.
II. ON THE PROBLEM OF AIR TRAFFIC
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
One goal of this paper is to show the obvious mis-
match between security research and the aviation community
concerning their approaches to the problem of air traffic
communications security. We consider the hypotheses that
either existing wireless security flaws are widely known within
aviation but are not deemed realistically exploitable, or that
awareness in the community simply does not exist.
As our investigation shows, aviation professionals at large
are unaware of the state of security in aviation technology.
A majority of participants falsely believe, for example, that
even the most common surveillance technologies offer au-
thentication, clearly contrasting with the security community’s
knowledge. Indeed, our findings are in line with research
from cognitive science, which suggests that so-called “expert
blind spots” exist: i.e., having a large amount of domain-
specific knowledge may prove disadvantageous on tasks such
as forming remote associations among disparate concepts [17].
We believe it is crucial to challenge the status quo of
cybersecurity in aviation, and to integrate it with the reality of
insecure technologies. Naturally, changes depend on increased
awareness from the users of these technologies, who can then
demand and help to develop solutions. On the other hand,
legacy requirements and the unique aviation environment often
prevent the straightforward use of established security solu-
tions such as cryptography in the short and medium term. Still,
with the help of the security community, it could be feasible to
develop systems that improve communications security in avi-
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Fig. 1: An overview of the wireless technologies used in air traffic communication, between ground stations, aircraft and satellites. The arrows
indicate the direction of the communication for each protocol. The Gantt chart shows their typical usage during the different flight phases.
ation within a shorter time span than the typical development
cycles of 20-30 years. We discuss current research trends and
challenges associated with practical solutions in Section VI.
In the remainder of this section, we give a brief initial
overview of the communication systems analyzed later in this
paper, and discuss the main factors that are considered as
mitigating potential attacks within the aviation community.
A. Overview of Air Traffic Communications
In this paper, we focus on the whole picture of avia-
tion as found under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), where
navigation depends on electronic signals. IFR usually apply
to large commercial aircraft, even though they are open to
any aircraft with the necessary equipment, including general
aviation (i.e., civil aviation that is not a scheduled air service
or air transport for remuneration or hire). However, many of
our findings also apply to flying under Visual Flight Rules
(VFR). Under European Organisation for the Safety of Air
Navigation (EUROCONTROL) and Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) regulations, aircraft under VFR need to equip
fewer communication systems and enjoy more freedom in their
choice compared to commercial aircraft, but also have fewer
options in case of their failure.
Fig. 1 provides a comprehensive, high-level picture of
currently employed wireless communication technologies in
commercial aviation, focusing on the interactions between the
technologies and their utilization during different flight phases.
To aid the reader’s understanding throughout the paper, we
have collected the most important acronyms in Table I. We
generally use broad definitions of communications and proto-
cols which include analog technologies as well as message-
based protocols transmitting digital data.
In order to focus on the systems view, we have divided
all technologies into three categories according to their ap-
plication: air traffic control, information services, and naviga-
tion aids. ATC protocols are used to enable communication
between controllers and pilots or their aircraft. They include
VHF, PSR, SSR, ADS-B, MLAT, and CPDLC, which are used
during all flight phases, usually on line-of-sight frequencies,
although the use of satellite communication is possible (e.g.,
CPDLC). Information services offer a more general platform
for the exchange of data such as weather and traffic in-
formation: we discuss ACARS, TCAS, FIS-B, and TIS-B.
Navigational aids, namely GPS, VOR, DME, NDB, and ILS,
locate the aircraft’s position in space and aid in the approach.
Navigation aids receive signals from separate infrastructure on
the ground or, in the case of GPS, from satellites.
While there is considerable fragmentation among aviation
systems all over the world, we aim to be as comprehensive and
generally applicable as possible. Technologies and procedures
related to military systems, both secret in nature and exclusive
to a country’s air force, are out of the scope of this paper. We
further appreciate that even some of the same systems differ
across regions, and due to space limitations, we cannot address
every exception. However, our findings are broadly applicable,
as the underlying technologies and principles are the same.
Air Traffic Management
Another way to categorize these technologies is to embed
them in the hierarchical model of air traffic management
(ATM) and to look at their time horizons and feedback loops.
After Klein [18], modern ATM can be divided into long-term,
centralized, strategic flow planning on the (supra-)national
stage; medium-term flow planning and control of smaller
sectors; and finally, the highly decentralized, immediate-term,
aircraft guidance and navigation (see also [19]).
As the time horizons narrows, ATM moves from the long-
term objective of safe and efficient flow management using
filed flight plans and historical movement data towards the
ultimate goal of accident prevention. Each control layer has
different deadlines depending on the operational requirements.
For example, long-term flow planning requires historical flight
data collected through ATC technologies but their integrity
does not provide an immediate concern for safety. In this work,
we focus on the short and medium term, where an attack on
wireless ATM technologies has the largest safety impact. This
comprises technologies transmitting data that is relevant for
hours (e.g., weather) or highly critical systems for collision
avoidance, which operate in the matter of seconds.
Potential Future Technologies
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
EUROCONTROL, and the FAA have started planning for
further upgrades of the current communications systems and
are seeking to develop new data links. Specifically, L-band
Digital Aeronautical Communications System (L-DACS) and
Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (Aero-
MACS) are supposed to replace the current VHF system.
Since these systems can provide much higher data throughput
comparing to the existing data links, some of the applications
currently provided by other technologies could also utilize
these new technologies one day. Thankfully, L-DACS and
AeroMACS have begun to at least consider the issue of
wireless security and some corresponding designs are already
included by the specifications or will be in the future.
Unfortunately, L-DACS is still in the very early speci-
fication phase and in line with typical technological cycles
in aviation will not be deployed before the 2030s [20]. Fur-
thermore, since its specification is not finished – many parts
are up in the air and there are still competing proposals –
they could strongly benefit from an immediately increased
awareness about security concerns in aviation, which we aim
to provide with our work.
AeroMACS takes the form of a profile of IEEE 802.16-
2009 [21], known as WiMAX. It intends to provide a surface
data link for use at the airport, allowing ATC, airlines, and
airports to communicate with the aircraft [22]. It has line-
of-sight range of up to 3 km per cell and uses commodity
radios to communicate. While the current standards include
cryptography, making it a serious step forward, AeroMACS
will not solve the security problems currently found in aviation.
Besides the prevalent issue of long deployment time frames
(the beginning of deployment is not projected before the
middle of the next decade), many security questions such
as the protection of management frames are still undecided
[23]. Most importantly, AeroMACS will only be able to
replace current data links on the ground and in the immediate
vicinity of an airport, leaving the vast amount of air traffic
communication unprotected.
AeroMACS is further along in the development cycle
compared to L-DACS, with test deployments going on at some
airports around the world. However, at the time of writing,
many of the necessary avionics standards and specifications
were still in the planning phase [22]. Thus, it was not possible
to include it in our survey but, like L-DACS, it should see
strong input from the security community as soon as possible.
B. Threat Model
In this section, we define the threat model that wireless
systems in aviation face. We distinguish between the traditional
adversarial model and the recently emerged model based on
a) the widespread distribution of accessible software-defined
radios and b) the ongoing move from analog to digital com-
munication systems (as pointed out in, e.g., [24]). We consider
active adversaries with the capability to eavesdrop, modify, and
inject data on the communications channel.
1) Traditional Aviation Threat Model: The traditional
threat model has been implicitly and explicitly used in aviation
since the introduction of radio communication and radar in
civil air traffic control in the first half of the 20th century.
Surveillance radar, navigation, and communication systems
originated from military applications and were later integrated
into the civil aviation airspace [25]. We characterize the threat
model used as comparatively naive, reflecting the general
state of computer security considerations within industrial
and infrastructure systems during this period. In short, the
model makes the following main assumptions on which today’s
aviation communications security is still based [26]:
• Inferior technological capabilities: Active adversarial ca-
pabilities were subscribed only to military and nation-state
attackers with the ability to conduct electronic warfare [27].
• Inferior financial capabilities: Similarly, it is further as-
sumed that electronic devices capable of distorting radar are
financially out of reach for all but the most capable attackers.
• Requirement of inside knowledge: An impactful attacker
needs to be an insider to obtain the necessary knowledge of
communication systems and general aviation conduct.
• Use of analog communication: Typical attacks on analog
communications are easier to detect for the user, e.g. some-
body hijacking the voice channel or causing a denial of
service at the PSR will typically be detected immediately.
2) Modern Threat Model: With the technological advance-
ments of the late 1990s and 2000s, the threat model changed
drastically, as the assumptions about adversaries ceased to
hold. For instance, in the 1990s, SDRs were first practically
adapted for military and closed commercial use [28]. However,
open-source projects such as GNURadio [29] released in 2001,
and finally the availability of cheap commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) software-defined radio transceivers spread adversarial
capabilities to a large and expanding group of people. They
enable a broad community with basic technological under-
standing to receive and process, craft and transmit arbitrary
signals – including those used in aviation. Contrary to the
pre-SDR era, hardware need not be purpose-built anymore
(requiring considerable technical and financial resources) but
can simply be programmed and re-programmed on the fly with
the necessary code and knowledge easily shared via Internet.
We make the following assumptions for an adversary
model that is adequate for wireless communications security
in modern aviation and which we use throughout this work:
• Increased digitization and automation: As we will point
out throughout the paper, there is a general trend in aviation
towards transmitting data such as flight clearances with
unauthenticated digital communication networks. While at-
tacks on analog technologies such as VHF have been in-
cluded in the traditional threat model, new digital attacks are
emerging which are easy to execute, potentially devastating,
and difficult to detect on the data link level for increasingly
automated systems and their users [30].
• Increased technological capabilities: With the widespread
availability of cheap SDR technology, it is reasonable to
assume that a large amount of people are capable of con-
ducting wireless attacks on aviation systems. The financial
barrier is all but gone with SDR receivers available from
as little as $10 while capable senders cost less than $100
with a strong downwards trajectory. In conjunction with
downloadable software, this development enables a new
class of unsophisticated attackers.
• Easy availability of aviation knowledge: Attackers have
general knowledge about processes and conventions in avi-
ation communications. Syntax and semantics of wireless
protocols can be obtained by outsiders through openly
accessible means, such as specification protocols, forums,
planespotting websites, and finally by capturing and exam-
ining real-world communication data.
In summary, attack capabilities shifting from military
adversaries to script kiddies, hobbyists, white hat hackers,
cybercrime organisations, and terrorists increase the likelihood
of attacks manifold. In conjunction with the move towards
unsecured digital networks, and increased deployment of ho-
mogeneous COTS hard- and software, the new threat model
goes beyond denial of service through traditional jamming and
requires us to rethink and address wireless security in aviation.
C. Mitigating Factors
Before our in-depth analysis, we want to consider some
of the existing factors that can help mitigate the threat of
wireless attacks on air traffic applications. These factors can
be divided into a) rules and procedures and b) the existence
of redundant communication systems. Both factors do not
traditionally consider security, i.e., malicious attacks on the
analyzed systems, but focus on maximizing the overall safety
of the aircraft, regardless of the interfering elements.
1) Procedures: Procedures and practices for systems fail-
ures are plentiful in aviation and try to cover all imaginable
cases. While they are purely aimed at non-deliberate failures,
many of them (e.g., lost communications procedures, the FAA’s
Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) plans for
major crises such as 9/11, ATC Zero procedures to handle local
failures of ATC centers) will have mitigating consequences for
deliberate attacks as well. Overall, human factors are of crucial
importance in aviation. Many pilots have experienced incorrect
instrument readings and are trained to check and double-check
at all times. On the ATC side, if a controller noticed more than
one aircraft using the same transponder identity, they would
call the plane and provide a different one, followed by a request
to set an IDENT flag that will be displayed on the ATC screens.
Unfortunately, even without malicious attackers, procedural
defenses are not always successful. One particular example is
when priorities and instructions of different protocols - both
human and technical - are not well-defined or even conflicting,
such as in the fatal 2002 U¨berlingen mid-air collision.1
On top of this, it is highly unlikely in reality that every
single malicious communications interference is detected by
humans and defended using only rules and procedures. Sophis-
ticated attacks on communication are simply never considered
in aviation training. Existing procedures (e.g., FAA regulations
and the Aeronautical Information Manual [31] for general
aviation in the US) cover only faulty systems, assuming that
available information is genuine and has not been maliciously
altered. Furthermore, any new generation of pilots is trained to
rely on instruments and digital systems even more,2 motivating
the increased need to secure their integrity.
2) Redundancy: Related to procedure-based mitigations is
the concept of redundancy. The most common type is the
use of hardware redundancy to improve the availability of
a system. This can, for example, include numerous duplicate
senders or receivers within the aircraft, or completely inde-
pendent systems. Similarly, any ATC ground station utilizes
several receivers for their surveillance or multilateration sys-
tems, making the failure of one, or even a few, unproblematic.
Besides this, there are procedures for wireless systems
failures that rely on different systems for redundancy. When
a primary data source is not available, there are often other
systems at the disposal of a pilot or a controller to obtain
the required information. For example, when a pilot under
instrument flight rules loses ILS capabilities, they can use other
navigation aids (e.g., DME/VOR) to aid the approach.
On the ATC side, an aircraft with a Mode A/C/S transpon-
der failure may still be tracked using PSR. However, the
altitude and ID, among other information, are lost, causing
a significant drag on the controller’s awareness and attention
while maintaining the required separation.
However, this type of technological redundancy has inher-
ent security flaws. As the technologies were not developed for
redundancy, but simply happened to become alternative options
because of legacy reasons, relying on older technologies comes
with a degradation of content quality. For example, separation
minima may need to be increased when SSR systems fail, or
an aircraft without working ILS receiver may lose its ability to
land on some airports in bad weather conditions. On top of this,
the availability of systems can differ across airports, making
general assurances difficult. Overall, technological redundancy
is effective in many cases when it comes to preserving safety.
However, it fails when there is no suspicion of malicious
activity by the user(s), or there are attacks on the procedures
themselves (i.e., multiple technologies are targeted).
III. SURVEY ON CYBERSECURITY IN AVIATION
To collect additional domain knowledge, data on the aware-
ness of cybersecurity in aviation and quantify the impact of
attacks, we conducted a survey across all aviation circles. This
survey is the first to address these issues publicly, and we
are thankful to aviation authorities and air navigation service
1The two aircraft had received different instructions from ATC and their
on-board equipment. By each following a different procedure, their collision
course was not resolved. See, e.g., http://goo.gl/WZFceZ for a full analysis.
2This reliance is illustrated by some recent incidents, most notably the Air
France disaster where the pilots flying trusted instruments even though they
knew they were unreliable [32].
providers (ANSP) for their help. Our survey was conducted
fully anonymously over the internet using SurveyMonkey,
with recruiting done via mailing lists of ANSP, airlines and
other aviation-related organisations, as well as two closely-
moderated forums for pilots. We did not aim to survey people
with knowledge in computer security, but to obtain a realistic
opinion of the aviation community as a whole.
The three main research questions that the survey looks to
answer are a) Which technologies are considered to have the
biggest impact on safety? b) Are aviation stakeholders aware
of security issues in the wireless technologies they utilize? c)
If yes, are these issues considered a concern towards safety?
We analyze the answers to these questions after discussing
the design of the study, and the demographics of the respon-
dents. We then discuss the respondents’ assessment of nine
concrete hypothetical attack scenarios in Section V.
A. Survey Limitations
We planned and conducted our survey with the help of
private pilots and a full-time professional air traffic controller
among the authors. They advised us on the appropriate ques-
tion language, and provided us with the necessary aviation
expertise and background at every stage during the design,
implementation, and execution of this survey. It is worth noting
that a survey-based analysis is an accepted tool in aviation
research. For example, the authors in [33] recently used it to
analyze the safety of the FIS-B protocol.
However, we are aware of the limitations of our approach.
We tried to mitigate confounding factors through our design,
but we acknowledge some potential limitations caused by the
characteristics found in aviation technology:
• Proprietary systems: Typically, systems are implemented
by different companies following loose standards. Even
some protocols (e.g., ACARS) have proprietary elements not
freely available. To counteract this problem, we abstracted
away from the concrete implementations. We designed the
questions such that we could draw more general conclusions
on the respondents’ knowledge of the systems’ security.
• Fragmentation: Likewise, there is a forest of different
systems, regulations, and processes in aviation. Depending
on the airspace, the availability, knowledge, and usage of
the discussed protocols differ. However, we mitigated this
problem by surveying experts from many countries, making
sure their judgment of security in aviation technologies did
not vary significantly.
• Representativeness: Considering distribution and potential
self-selection, we do not claim that our results are neces-
sarily representative of the aviation community. Yet, when
reconciling with comments and conversations with experts,
we believe in their validity.
Overall, we believe it is an important task to abstract away
from single technologies and gather a more systemic picture
of the awareness on wireless security in aviation as a whole.
B. Ethical Considerations
We acknowledge the potentially sensitive nature of analyz-
ing air traffic communication protocols and raising awareness
Group # Respondents Share
Private Pilot 77 32.0%
Commercial Pilot 59 24.5%
Civil ATC 37 15.4%
Aviation Engineer 10 4.1%
Aviation Authority 7 2.9%
Military Pilot 5 2.1%
Military ATC 4 1.7%
Other 42 17.4%
TABLE II: Occupations of survey respondents (n = 242).
of easily exploitable security flaws. ATC is considered a critical
public infrastructure protecting the lives of billions of people
every year but while we argue that wireless attacks in general
become more and more feasible for non-state actors, some
isolated protocols have been widely analyzed by both hacker
communities and academic researchers. The vulnerabilities
inherent in these protocols have been known for years and even
concrete exploits are widely available in hard- and software.
While we consider the overall state of aviation communications
security a serious one, redundancy and existing processes still
mostly protect modern airspaces currently.
We conducted our survey fully anonymously, to protect
respondents from potential repercussions when speaking about
the security of ATC systems or disclosing safety problems. We
follow a responsible disclosure process, working with ATC
institutions during the planning and discussions phase of our
research. We notified these institutions of our results and plan
to work closely with them in the future. We obtained ethical
approval from the University of Oxford’s Social Sciences
& Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee
(IDREC) under the Ref No: SSD/CUREC1A/15-033.
C. Initial Survey Results
Demographics: We had 242 completed surveys, 110 or
45.5% from a controlled dissemination (CD) using internal
mailing lists of aviation-related companies and authorities, and
132 or 54.5% from a separate open dissemination (OD) on
internet aviation forums. We compared the results of both and
found no significant differences in the respondents’ evaluations
apart from their professions: 55.7% of OD respondents were
part of general aviation (GA), i.e., private pilots and not
otherwise working in aviation, compared to only 3.6% of CD
respondents. We analyze the responses as a whole unless stated
otherwise. Not all questions have been answered by all experts,
accounting for differences in the number of respondents as
indicated for all reported results.
The participants’ aviation experience was fairly evenly
distributed, with 32% having 20 years or more, and about
22% offering an expertise of less than 5 years, 5-10 years,
and 10-20 years, respectively. The top working countries were
the UK (37.7%) and the US (23.3%). A further 37.3% work in
Continental Europe, with 4 respondents from other countries
around the world (Indonesia, Hong Kong, Canada, UAE).
As illustrated in Table II, most of our respondents were pri-
vate (32%) or commercial pilots (24.5%) followed by civil air
traffic controllers (15.4%) and aviation engineers (4.1%). We
had responses from professions as varied as Air Traffic Safety
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of each protocol. The respondents (n = 235) answered three questions. Q1: “How would you rate the flight safety impact of each of these
technologies?”, Q2: “How do you rate the likelihood that a malicious party injects false information into these technologies?”, and Q3: “How
would you rate the trustworthiness of information derived from these technologies against intentional manipulation by a malicious party?”.
Answers were provided on an equidistant 5-point-Likert scale. The circles show the availability of published attacks and (publicly or privately)
reported incidents for each protocol. Gray circles are protocols vulnerable by extension as they depend on data from other vulnerable protocols.
Electronics Personnel, researchers at ANSPs, ATC technicians,
aviation software developers, or Flight Information Service
Officers/ Instructors amongst others. The average response
time length was 31 minutes and 10 seconds, which, along with
the plethora of comments, shows that the respondents took the
survey seriously.
Self-assessed Knowledge and Work Environment: The re-
spondents judged their air traffic communication knowledge
above average for their field (3.76 out of a symmetric, equidis-
tant 5-point Likert scale, where 1 is “very bad” and 5 is
“very good”). The technologies that the respondents considered
themselves most familiar with are GPS, VHF, ILS, VOR and
Mode A/C/S. This is explained by the prevalence and impor-
tance of these technologies in current aviation processes: Mode
A/C/S and VHF are also the most relied upon technologies,
followed by TCAS, GPS, and ILS.
Impact Assessment: While our detailed analysis follows in
later sections, Fig. 2 shows that VHF, ILS, GPS, Mode A/C/S,
and TCAS are considered the technologies with the highest
safety impact, all around 4.5 out of 5 (“very high”). But even
the least important technologies (which are either outdated –
NDB and VOR – or not widely operational yet – CPDLC,
FIS-B, TIS-B) still have a moderate impact according to the
respondents. Generally, the isolated impact of a single protocol
is often considered limited. A German controller represents the
feelings of many (but not all): “in case of loss there are still
backup systems and cross-check possibilities so there are no
really high impact ratings”, illustrating the traditional safety
approach of redundancy extended to security.
Security Assessment: As shown by the red (middle) bars
in Fig. 2, the navigation aids (with the exception of GPS), and
TCAS are considered by far the most trustworthy protocols
when it comes to the likelihood of manipulation by an adver-
sary. VHF is considered the least trustworthy (>60% say it is
“very likely” or “likely” to be attacked) by the participants.
Of the digital protocols, ADS-B and GPS were considered the
most likely to be attacked. We speculate this might be due to
the raised awareness caused by widely publicized attacks. Still,
all technologies except VHF are considered relatively unlikely
to be attacked, despite the prevalence of reported attacks and
incidents indicated in Fig. 2 and discussed in detail later.
Consistently, the technology most respondents believed
lacked integrity and authentication mechanisms is VHF (see
Fig. 3), followed by NDB. For all other technologies, the re-
spondents believed they offered such security mechanisms, or
did not know. In general, there was a high uncertainty (>15%
of respondents), even for the most well-known technologies.
IV. WIRELESS COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN
AVIATION
In this section, we analyze the security features and impact
of all considered air traffic communication technologies more
closely, while contrasting it with the opinions of the surveyed
aviation experts. As the application of the technologies de-
termines the consequences and severity of security breaches,
we divide the technologies accordingly in three categories. In
principle, all technologies in a category can at least partly serve
the required application.
Air traffic control comprises technologies which support air
traffic services. This includes communication links between
controllers and pilots and technologies for monitoring air
traffic. Information services are technologies which provide
information to pilots to improve their situational awareness
(e.g., weather or traffic information). Finally, radio navigation
aids provide the pilots means to navigate in the air during
different phases of flight.
A. Air Traffic Control
ATC protocols enable communication between controllers
and pilots or their aircraft. They establish information about
the aircarft’s position and intent and thus the safety of the
airspace. Table III provides an overview of their technical
details. Fig. 3 breaks down two aspects of the protocols based
on survey data: impact according to stakeholders, and whether
respondents believe that they offer integrity and authenticity.
Voice (VHF)
Voice communication [34] is the primary means of com-
munication between ATC and the aircraft which is reflected
by its high safety impact rating across all surveyed groups in
Fig. 3. It is used to transmit all ATC instructions (clearances)
to the aircraft, which are acknowledged by the pilot, as well
as pilots’ reports and requests to ATC. Flight information
service, weather, and airport information broadcasts can also
be provided by voice communication. It is further used for
operational communication between the airline operator and
the aircraft, as far as the aircraft is in range of the operator’s
transmitter. Voice communication is conducted by analog radio
on VHF and HF (outside VHF range, e.g., over oceans) [35].
Security Considerations: Successful VHF communication
depends on the correct understanding of the message by the
communication partners. Besides taking care of human factors,
a high quality signal must be ensured. Simultaneous use of the
frequency leads to a partial or full denial of service (DoS)
in practice. Despite the fact that VHF employs amplitude
modulation (AM), which allows reception of multiple channels
on the same frequency, it is difficult to maintain service with
an attacker dedicated to disturb the intended communication.
Authentication procedures are available for military flights
only, in case the pilot insists. As they are time and capacity
consuming, they are not applied for civil flights. When CPDLC
is not available, as in most regions currently, or the aircraft
is not equipped with it, there is no backup protocol for VHF.
Losing this main communication layer within highly-populated
airspaces results in a severe threat.
VHF is the least trusted protocol in our survey by a
significant margin (see Fig. 2 and 3). Many experts report
actual experience with non-legitimate uses of the frequency,
one noting “VHF is an increasingly common comms signal to
be maliciously emulated by non-involved parties. Particularly
on tower frequencies. Anyone can buy an aviation transceiver
without licence.” while others mention problems with pirate
radio stations. There are some related incidents with spoofed
voice communication reported in the aviation literature and on
the Internet [36], and recent works also discuss the urgent need
to improve the security of VHF [36], [37]. While intruders
are quickly detected through changes in signal or voice levels,
between 30% and 40% of VHF users believe it offers technical
integrity and authenticity checks. Furthermore, attackers could
effectively disable VHF (e.g., by jamming) and make aircraft
rely on backup systems using unauthenticated data links (e.g.,
CPDLC) where manipulation is much harder to detect.
Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC)
CPDLC is a message-based service offering an alternative
for voice communication between ATC and pilot. ATC can
use CPDLC via a terminal to send clearances or requests.
The pilot can send requests and reports by selecting prede-
fined phrases (e.g., REQUEST, WHEN CAN WE) or free
text. CPDLC has great advantages over VHF: the number of
acoustic misunderstandings is reduced, messages are saved for
accountability, and it is easier, more efficient, and safer to
transmit and receive long messages such as flight plan changes
during flight. For example, VHF depends on the controller
to catch a wrongly understood flight level instruction while
he is also busy with several other aircraft; with CPDLC such
mistakes can be eliminated and the communication demands
on the pilot reduced by as much as 84% [38].
CPDLC is not widely used yet as indicated by the fact
that 30% of our survey respondents had never heard of it.
Some busy airports already employ it for automated clearance
delivery and start up approval, in some European airspaces
it is also used in-flight for minor tasks. Currently, CPDLC
uses VHF Data Link Version 2 (VDL) [39] as its data link.
Coverage is provided by ground stations and satellites to ensure
availability where required, even in oceanic regions. It has
been successfully used for more than a decade in airspaces not
covered by VHF as it offers easier communication (via satel-
lite) compared to HF with its signal propagation difficulties.
Without CPDLC, time-critical ATC clearances or pilot requests
very often cannot reach the destination in due time, which
forces pilots to deviate from ATC clearance without permission
(for example to avoid bad weather) causing a safety problem.
Indeed, the transit times of HF Data Link (HFDL) messages
do not meet the requirements for some aircraft separation
standards. Such issues are eliminated with CPDLC.
Security Considerations: Compared with VHF, relying on
an unauthenticated data link becomes a larger problem as at-
tack detection is much harder without voice recognition. Thus,
it is problematic that less than 10% of all respondents are aware
that CPDLC is not authenticated, especially considering the
plans of many aviation authorities to shift more responsibilities
towards CPDLC in the future. As shown in Fig. 3, across all
groups, a majority of those respondents, who said they knew
the answer, was mistaken about its security capabilities.
Attacks on CPDLC’s availability are less critical currently,
as CPDLC is still used as a secondary communication layer.
Protocol attacks such as message manipulation or injection
are severe when undetected, as clearances and other flight
safety-related information are transmitted using CPDLC. As
there is no authentication, it is trivial to eavesdrop on or
spoof clearances and execute replay and message alteration
attacks as discussed further in [40]. Impersonation is easily
possible: to login to the responsible Area Control Center, the
pilot simply puts the correct Location Indicator (e.g., SBAO
for ATLANTICO, the control center in Recife, Brasil) into the
terminal. After a handshake, the user is successfully logged in.
Likewise, an attacker can claim the identity of an ATC unit
and send instructions to an aircraft causing the pilot to perform
unnecessary, dangerous manoeuvres or causing ATC inquiries.
Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR)
PSR is the acronym for non-cooperative aircraft localiza-
tion systems using radar. In aviation, these usually consist of
a rotating antenna radiating a pulse position-modulated and
highly directional electromagnetic beam on a low GHz band
[41]. The pulses are reflected by targets and bearing and round
trip time are measured to get the target’s position. PSR is
independent of aircraft’s equipment, however dependent on
the reflecting area (surface material and size, distance and
orientation of the aircraft in space). Due to this, and the
fact that the signal has to travel two-way, very high radiation
power is required (several MW). As the received information is
carried by analog signals, the system has to deal with numerous
disturbing echoes caused by terrain, obstacles, weather, flocks
of birds or even cars on elevated roads. This makes complex
signal processing necessary to extract the desired information.
VHF ADS-B SSR MLAT CPDLCPSR
Fig. 3: Assessment of ATC technologies’ safety impact and security capabilities (authentication and integrity). Data gathered from 43 commercial
pilots, 55 private pilots, 32 controllers, 45 others.
In military airspace surveillance, PSR is strictly required, as
it is crucial to detect aircraft with intentionally non-working
transponders. In civil ATC, however,3 PSR is used merely to
detect aircraft with rare transponder failures and not as stan-
dard backup. Neither identification nor altitude are provided
by PSR, the tracker software system uses PSR solely to verify
and improve the quality of targets obtained by other sensors.
Security Considerations: As PSR systems use a signal-
based detection approach, they are not subject to protocol
attacks such as message injection. However, jamming on any
of the operational frequencies is possible [42], although due
to high power requirements remains in the realm of military
electronic warfare. Normally, missing PSR information (caused
by jamming) does not impact controllers as the main target
information (position, identification, altitude, intent) is pro-
vided separately. This might also explain the large majority
of controllers (almost 60%), who believe PSR offers integrity
checks. While military PSR can offer security measures such as
frequency hopping or modulation schemes, these are unavail-
able in civil aviation. Similar to other sensor systems, PSR may
also be vulnerable to attacks on its timebase (e.g., GPS). Still,
PSR can be considered relatively secure compared to other
technologies. PSR belongs to the oldest ATC technologies and
is phased out in favor of more modern data communication
protocols using more accurate satellite systems (see below).
This can potentially reducing long-term security as reliance
on unauthenticated dependent technologies increases.
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR)
The transponder modes A, C, and S (short: Mode A/C/S)
are part of the Secondary Surveillance Radar [43]. The coop-
erative technology provides more target information on ATC
radar screens, as PSR only offers an unidentified target position
without further data. SSR uses digital messages with different
frequencies and modulations for the interrogation (1030 MHz)
and the reply (1090 MHz). SSR ground stations interrogate
aircraft transponders, which reply with the desired information.
The reply is also used to locate the aircraft’s position using
the antenna’s bearing and the message round trip time. In this
digital process, a radiation power of about 1 kW is sufficient,
much less compared to PSR. The older Modes A and C (ID
and altitude) are being substituted by Mode S which supports
selective interrogations, to relieve the saturated 1090 MHz
3E.g., in the major Central European airspace one of the authors works in.
reply channel, suffering from severe message loss. Mode S also
offers a worldwide unique transponder ID and further message
formats (e.g., aircraft intent or autopilot modes).
Security Considerations: With the publication of Mode S
implementations for SDRs on the Internet (e.g., dump1090),
a somewhat knowledgeable attacker can exercise full control
over the communication channel, i.e., by modifying, jamming,
or injecting Mode A/C/S messages into ATC systems, he can
create a fully distorted picture of the airspace as seen by ATC.
Every Mode S message carries an identifier which can be
replaced with an arbitrary one. Using a known and trusted
aircraft identifier may, for example, reduce the likelihood for
detection compared to an unexpected object on the radar. Mode
S also offers special emergency codes selected by the pilot
(e.g., 7500 for hijacking, 7600 for lost communications, and
7700 for an emergency). Injecting these can directly cause ATC
inquiries. While this happens occasionally through transponder
failures and wrong settings (see [2]), this feature can actively
be used to create confusion at a busy ground station.
As Mode A/C/S is the only source for all necessary
information displayed on ATC radar screen (explaining its high
impact rating across all groups), manipulation or jamming is
a severe threat since no equivalent backup exists. Mode S
messages and its data link are also used by other ATC systems,
which consequently inherit most of its vulnerabilities as we
will discuss in the next sections. Worryingly, more than 40%
of all respondents wrongly believe the protocol offers built-in
security features, including a notable 60% among controllers.
A vulnerability specific to Mode S is the amplification
attack. Exploiting interrogations in Mode S, an attacker can
cause large-scale interference on the 1090 MHz channel with-
out sending on the target frequency (but on the 1030 MHz
interrogation frequency instead). Interrogations are limited to
a maximum of 250/s now [47], but these restrictions are placed
on the interrogators, not on the Mode S transponders in aircraft.
As Mode S messages are unauthenticated, a malicious sender
can easily circumvent these measures and use non-selective
interrogations to amplify her sending power and frequency.
By changing her own identifier code, the attacker can make
all receiving aircraft answer the interrogations, increasing
the range and capability of the interference attack manifold.
While the aircraft continue to send useful information, the
interference level in even moderately busy airspaces would
Voice PSR Mode A/C/S ADS-B CPDLC
Use Communication
ATC-Cockpit
Non-cooperative aircraft
detection and
positioning
Cooperative aircraft
detection, positioning and
data exchange
Broadcast ATC and
collision avoidance
relevant aircraft data
Communication ATC-
Cockpit
Type Selective & Broadcast Broadcast Interrogation Broadcast Selective
Sender Aircraft & Ground Ground Aircraft Aircraft Aircraft & Ground
Receiver Aircraft & Ground Original Sender Aircraft & Ground Aircraft & Ground Aircraft & Ground
Frequency 3.4-23.35, 117.975-143.975,
225-400 MHz
1-2 & 2-4 GHz band 1030 & 1090 MHz 978 & 1090 MHz VDL2: 136.975 MHz
Data Rate Not applicable Not applicable 1 Mbps (Mode S) 1 Mbps 30 kbps
Contents Clearances, pilot requests,
any other information
Pulses A: squawk, C: altitude, S:
as ADS-B but no position
position, velocity, altitude,
ID, callsign, intent, etc.
Clearances, requests,
weather, further data
Link Layer Radio (amplitude
modulation)
Pulse position
modulation
Mode A/C/S UAT / Mode S 1090ES VDL / HFDL / satcom
Data Source Pilot & Controller Radar Aircraft Aircraft Several
Signal Analog Analog Digital Digital VDL2+: digital
Adoption In use In use In use Parts of the world, in
adoption
Parts of the world, in
adoption
Standards/References [34], [35] [41] [43] [44]–[46] [39]
TABLE III: Detailed characteristics of air traffic control protocols.
quickly cause a partial DoS as important data gets lost.
As a concrete example, the FAA uses a stochastic prob-
ability of 0.254 to calculate the number of replies to a given
Mode S all-call [47]. Thus, an attacker can create an amplified
response of x ∗ y ∗ 0.25 messages per second, where x is the
number of receiving aircraft and y the number of all-calls per
second. Based on data from our own Mode S receivers, 200
aircraft are easily in range within a normal airspace. Thus, an
attacker can use only 100 messages to create 100∗200∗0.25 =
5000 additional Mode S messages, adding to the significant
existing interference experienced by all ATC receivers.5 If done
with consideration, such an attacker is also more difficult to
detect from the ground. In addition, a recent incident showed
that some transponders are susceptible to over-interrogation.
Sending many interrogation calls can lead to overheating and
result in a complete loss of the target from ATC displays due
to a full DoS of the transponders. Investigations revealed that
transponders transmit at rates beyond their requirements and
design limits, worsening amplification attacks [49].
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B)
The ADS-B protocol [44] is used by aircraft to continually
broadcast their own ID, position and velocity as well as further
information such as intent or urgency codes. These broadcasts
happen twice a second in case of position and velocity, and
once every 5 s for identification. It is mandated for use by
2020 in US and European airspaces, promising to improve
on location accuracy and decrease system costs by replacing
SSR [50]. ADS-B exemplifies the move to cooperative data
communication networks in the next ATC protocol generation
but as of now, its impact is limited compared to VHF and SSR.
Security Considerations: As the commercially used ADS-
B data link 1090 Extended Squitter (1090ES) is based on
unauthenticated Mode S, it suffers from the same passive and
active attacks. For example, it is possible to selectively jam
4Accounting for interference and the time when a transponder is busy.
5The signal load is approaching 100% in some scenarios [48].
all ADS-B messages of a single aircraft, which would make it
vanish from the ADS-B channel. This feat is much more easily
accomplished with ADS-B’s regular broadcasts compared to
Mode S’ interrogation system using directional antennas and
much more frequent, irregular interrogations.
Furthermore, as ADS-B additionally broadcasts the posi-
tion of aircraft, this opens some new attack vectors (we do not
go into detail as ADS-B has been the focus of recent research
and media attention, see, e.g., [51], [52]) which only require
standard off-the-shelf hardware to execute as demonstrated in
[6], [8]. Trivially injected ADS-B messages claiming to be
non-existing aircraft are impossible to tell apart from authentic
ones on the link layer. Other attacks virtually modify the
trajectory of an aircraft by selectively jamming an aircraft’s
messages and replacing them with modified data. This causes
discrepancies between the real position and the one received
by ATC [8]. This is a worrying prospect, as ADS-B is set to
be the main ATC protocol in the long term, with the FAA
considering elimination of Mode A/C/S transponders at some
point in the future.6 Yet, less than 20% of the participating
pilots and controllers are aware of its shortcomings.
Multilateration (MLAT)
Multilateration, or hyperbolic positioning, has been suc-
cessfully employed for decades in military and civil applica-
tions, not limited to navigation. It differs from other ATC aids
as it is not a separate protocol but exploits the time differences
of arrival of signals received from aircraft independently using
other protocols, SSR or ADS-B in the aviation context [53].
Using the reception times of four or more receivers, it is a
purely geometric task to find the unknown point. Fig. 3 shows
that there is a significant difference in the impact assessment
between pilots, who do not actively use MLAT, and controllers
whose work partly relies upon it. This also explains the high
uncertainty surrounding the security features of MLAT in the
commercial/private pilot groups.
6See https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/programs/adsb/faq/
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Fig. 4: Assessment of information services’ impact and security capabilities (authentication and integrity).
Security Considerations: In theory, MLAT as a technology
does not rely on the contents of the received messages but (sim-
ilar to PSR) works purely on the signal level. This provides a
strong theoretical security advantage because it does not suffer
from compromised message integrity. Even if the contents of,
e.g., an ADS-B message are wrong, the location of the sender
can still be identified. Thus, MLAT offers additional security
based on physical layer properties (here the propagation speed
of electromagnetic waves) which are difficult to cheat.
However, in practical implementations this assumption
fails. Typical MLAT systems heavily rely on fusing the loca-
tion data gained from the signals with SSR message contents
to display identification and altitude of the targets, leaving
the system as a whole vulnerable. Independently from this
problem, a well-coordinated and synchronized attacker could
still manipulate a message’s time of arrival at the distributed
receivers of an MLAT system such that using these signals for
location estimation would result in a position of the attacker’s
choice [54]. This is shown in [55] for the similar case of
spoofing a group of distributed GPS receivers. The authors find
that even though more receivers severely restrict the possible
attacker placement, attacks are generally feasible. Yet, MLAT
is a favored SSR backup solution in aviation [56] and academic
communities [57]. Unfortunately, it is very expensive to deploy
(in part due to its susceptibility to multipath propagation) and
thus not a preferred option in all environments [58].
B. Information Services
Information services are more general platforms for the
exchange of aviation information. They use a variety of sources
and supply the backbone for a wide array of use cases. Table
IV provides the technical details, and Fig. 4 gives the survey
respondents’ assessment of their safety impact and security
features. Overall, we can see that TCAS is considered to have
a very high safety impact by all respondents, while the other
information services are less important, at least towards safety.
Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System
(ACARS)
ACARS [59] is a digital datalink developed for general
communication between aircraft and ground stations. ACARS
messages are divided into two types, air traffic services mes-
sages for ATC, flight information and alerting, and aeronautical
operational control messages which most airlines use to com-
municate with their aircraft. It is used in all flight phases,
for services as varied as dispatch, operations, engineering,
catering, or customer service. They transmit safety-critical data
such as aircraft weight, fuel, engine data, or weather reports;
privacy-related information about passengers or catering re-
quests; and information critical to business operations such as
gate assignments, crew schedules, or flight plan updates.
ACARS offers five data links, depending on the aircraft’s
equipment: VHF, Inmarsat satcom, Iridium satellite, VDL
Version 2, and High Frequency Data Link. The messages are
character-oriented and only accept valid ASCII symbols [1].
Security Considerations: ACARS security issues are long
known, a 2001 military study says [62]: “The military is un-
comfortable with the ease at which eavesdropping on ACARS
can be achieved.” Today, ACARS eavesdropping has become
much more widely accessible as SDR-based decoders are
available on the Internet (e.g., http://acarsd.org), and even
the satellite data link is easy to attack. To counter this, the
ACARS message security (AMS) standard was developed [63].
It provides end-to-end encryption using ECDSA with SHA256
for digital signatures and offers message authentication codes
with HMAC-SHA256 of a default length of 32 bits. AMS
currently enjoys very little adoption as only few airlines (e.g.,
Lufthansa [64]) even consider securing ACARS transmissions.
Others (e.g., Ryanair [65]) forego ACARS completely and use
airport-based mobile phone technologies.
Furthermore, airlines use their own semantics for data
packets transmitted by ACARS, providing some security by
obscurity.7 Due to these differences in implementations and ap-
plications supported by ACARS, discussing all potential attack
vectors is not possible here. Yet, there are some examples in
the literature, including the potential exploitation of soft- and
hardware flaws using the interface offered by ACARS [10]
or issuing wrong ATC instructions [62]. Besides, it is easy
to imagine the impact on business intelligence and personal
privacy when passenger lists, crew information, or engine data
are transmitted in clear text via ACARS.
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
TCAS [60] is an airborne system for collision avoidance in-
dependent of ground-based ATC. The current version TCAS II
uses the available information (i.e., identity, altitude) from ATC
protocols such as Mode C and S (ADS-B will be incorporated
7A US military presentation [62] considers binary AOC messages less
vulnerable as they are not human-readable.
ACARS TCAS FIS-B TIS-B
Use Dispatch, operations, maintenance... Collision avoidance Flight information Traffic information
Type Broadcast Interrogation Broadcast Broadcast
Sender Aircraft & Ground Aircraft Ground Radar Ground Radar
Receiver Aircraft & Ground Aircraft & Ground Aircraft Aircraft
Frequency 129.125-136.900 MHz 1030 & 1090 MHz 978 MHz 978 & 1090 MHz
Data Rate 2400 bps 1 Mbps 1 Mbps 1 Mbps
Contents Position, weather, fuel & engine
information, delays, maintenance...
Altitude, relative position,
transponder status
Weather text & graphics, notices
to airmen, terminal information
Non-ADS-B equipped
aircraft
Link Layer Several Mode S & 1090ES UAT UAT & 1090ES
Data Source Various ADS-B & Mode S FIS-B Provider Radar station
Signal Digital Digital Digital Digital
Adoption In use In use Parts of the US Parts of the US
Standards/References [59] [60] [61] [44]
TABLE IV: Detailed characteristics of information services protocols.
in the future) to provide a traffic surveillance display of all
equipped aircraft in the proximity [1]. It determines the relative
velocity and distance of nearby transponder-equipped aircraft
through interrogation. When a broadcast Mode S message is
received, the transmitted ID is added to a list of aircraft that
is then interrogated at about 1 Hz. With the reply, distance
and altitude of the interrogated aircraft are determined. With
ADS-B messages, the interrogation step becomes unnecessary.
Based on the relative velocities and positions, potential threats
are identified and presented to the pilot as a Traffic Advisory.
When proximity thresholds are violated, TCAS issues a Reso-
lution Advisory (RA) and proposes an avoidance maneuver to
eliminate the threat (in the latter case TCAS can be classified as
ATC protocol, too). Due to its function, TCAS has received one
of the highest safety impact ratings from all our respondents,
particularly the commercial pilots (see Fig. 4).
Security Considerations: As TCAS is based on data and
message formats of Mode A/C/S (and ADS-B, which it will
integrate in newer versions), it suffers from the unauthenticated
nature of these protocols described above. Strikingly, only 25%
of our respondents realized this as shown in Fig. 4, including
less than 10% of the ATC group. The potential attack vectors
of TCAS differ, however, as the main targets are aircraft, not
ground stations. Attacking aircraft at cruising altitude requires
a strong transceiver, making an attack from within the aircraft
more likely. One concern is an attacker who falsifies the data
that TCAS uses to be aware of the surveillance picture around
an aircraft. To do this, answers to Mode S interrogations
by TCAS are spoofed using wrong information and message
timings. The attacked TCAS system will classify such ghost
aircraft as a threat and initiate an RA to which the pilot
needs to respond. As even real advisories can lead to serious
incidents, a loss of situational awareness is very possible [66].
Another attack focuses on the RA messages themselves.
Issuing fake advisories to ATC ground stations using Mode S
RA reports is an easy way to cause a partial loss of situational
awareness and control. Since controllers are prohibited from
interfering with RAs, effective air traffic controlling is strongly
inhibited. Considering the relative ease of such attacks, and the
potentially severe impact, TCAS provides the biggest contrast
of all protocols between the participants’ security perception
and the technical reality, only matched by Mode A/C/S.
Flight Information System - Broadcast (FIS-B)
FIS-B [61] is a general flight information service that
requires aircraft to be equipped with ADS-B In. It uses the
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) [45], [46] datalink on
978 MHz which offers more flexibility through larger ADS-
B messages. It is in use in parts of the US, with a wider
adoption possible in the future (many European respondents
did not know the protocol). FIS-B provides data about airspace
restrictions, or meteorological advisories. The data is supplied
by the FAA for general aviation below 24,000 ft [67].
Security Considerations: FIS-B is based on the unauthen-
ticated ADS-B data link UAT. It is thus trivial to manip-
ulate or replay the broadcast messages sent out by ground
station service providers [68]. The payload encoding of FIS-
B is available at http://fpr.tc.faa.gov, requiring a non-verified
registration. Decoders of weather data sent over FIS-B such as
METAR (Meterological Aviation Reports) are widely available
on the Internet. Thus, it is not difficult to send out forged
broadcasts of weather reports or severe weather forecast alerts,
even raster scan pictures, following the standard specification.
Traffic Information System - Broadcast (TIS-B)
TIS-B [44] is another ground-based traffic information
service used in the US that broadcasts additional data about
aircraft that are not equipped with ADS-B transponders. TIS-
B is used for increased situational awareness and collision
avoidance. The system uses the same frequencies as ADS-B
and the same message format and provides users with a full
surveillance picture as seen by ground radar, i.e., the broadcast
data can be compiled from all available sources such as PSR,
SSR, ADS-B, or MLAT.
Security Considerations: TIS-B uses both available ADS-
B data links. Again, as both are unauthenticated, it is trivial
to manipulate or replay the broadcast messages sent out by
ground station service providers with the same means as
explained above. Forged TIS-B messages broadcast to airborne
targets can advertise non-existing aircraft or manipulate infor-
mation (e.g., position) about aircraft without their own beacon
transponder [67]. Both FIS-B and TIS-B are currently of
limited safety impact outside areas busy with general aviation
in the US, which explains why many of our participants do
not have an informed opinion about their security features.
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Fig. 5: Assessment of navigation aids safety impact and security capabilities (authentication and integrity).
C. Radio Navigation Aids
This section provides a brief introduction to the most
common radio navigation aids. More detailed descriptions can
be found in the ICAO standard document [69] or in [70]. An
overview of the technical details is provided by Table V. Due
to their much simpler application - to help navigate - they are
also subject to simpler attacks, which we discuss together.
Global Positioning System (GPS)
GPS [71] is the de facto standard global navigation satellite
system (GNSS). It allows for determining the position and
velocity of its users and precise time coordination. It is a
ranging system from known positions of multiple satellites
to an unknown position on land, sea, and air. Orbiting satel-
lites therefore continuously transmit navigation signals which
include precise timestamps and information to reduce the
positioning error. The ranging is done by measuring the time
of flight or the relative phase offsets of these signals from
n ≥ 4 satellites. This results in a system of n equations
with four unknowns (the three-dimensional coordinates and
the offset of the user’s clock to the system time) which can be
solved using numerical methods to obtain the desired position
and time information [70]. The use of GPS for air navigation
is only allowed if the integrity of the derived information is
monitored at all times [31]. There are two basic approaches:
In ground- or satellite-based augmentation systems (GBAS
or SBAS, respectively), fixed ground stations monitor the
integrity of the GPS signals and notify users about errors. This
integrity information is then propagated to the users directly
(i.e., ground-based) or via satellites.
An alternative approach to integrity monitoring is to use an
aircraft-based augmentation system. Here, the position solution
is integrated with redundant information available on board
the aircraft. There are two general classes of aircraft-based
integrity monitoring: receiver autonomous integrity monitoring
(RAIM), which uses GNSS information exclusively, and air-
craft autonomous integrity monitoring, which uses information
from additional on-board sensors (e.g., barometric altimeter,
clock or the inertial navigation system) [72]. In RAIM, at
least six satellites are used to detect faulty satellite signals by
solving the system of equations for all subsets of the satellites.
VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range (VOR)
VOR [69] enables aircraft to determine their clockwise an-
gular deviation (bearing) from magnetic North to fixed ground
stations. The ground stations broadcast an omnidirectional
reference signal and a highly directional variable signal. The
reference signal is a frequency modulated 30 Hz signal with
constant amplitude. The variable signal is a signal which
rotates clockwise in space with 30 rotations per second. This
rotation results in a 30 Hz amplitude modulation component of
the carrier frequency. Both signals are synchronized such that
their phase-offset corresponds to the direction of transmission.
This offset can be determined at a receiver by comparing the
phase of the frequency-modulated reference wave with that of
the amplitude-modulated signal component.
To identify a VOR station, its two- or three-letter identifier
is broadcast using Morse code. In most cases, the identi-
fier along with advisories and service information are also
transmitted in a recorded automatic voice.8 To use VOR for
navigation, the stations’ positions must be known. If two
or more VORs are received, the intersection of the lines of
positions to the VORs is the receiver’s position.
Nondirectional Beacons (NDB)
NDBs [69] are omnidirectional transmitters at fixed po-
sitions. Aircraft equipped with direction-finders (rotating di-
rectional antenna or beamforming-like antenna arrays) can
determine the angle of arrival of the signal of an NDB and
thereby the direction of the transmitter. A Morse code identifier
is sent every 30 s using on/off keying. NDBs can be used for
navigation by looking up their position in a chart.
Distance-measuring Equipment (DME)
DME [69] is an interrogation-based ranging system. Air-
craft transmit a random sequence of pulse pairs and the ground
transponder responds after a fixed delay (typically 50 µs) with
the same pulse sequence. The interrogating aircraft searches for
this pattern and locks to it to have a narrowed search window
for the next interrogations. The distance from the aircraft to
the transponder corresponds to the round-trip time (minus the
50 µs) multiplied with the propagation speed of the signals.
8This depends on the equipment of sender/receiver, see [31], Section 3.3.6.
GPS VOR ILS NDB DME
Use Positioning, Time Bearing Approach Guidance Direction Distance
Type Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Interrogation
Sender Satellite Ground Station Ground Antenna Array Ground Station Ground Station
Frequency 1.57542 & 1.2276 GHz 108.975-117.975 MHz 75, 108-111.975,
328.6-335.4 MHz
190-1,750 kHz 962–1,213 MHz
Contents 3D position, time sync Bearing Deviation from approach Direction to ground station Distance to ground station
Method Time difference of arrival Phase shift Signal strength Angle of arrival Round-trip time
Standards/References [71], [72] [69], [70] [69], [70] [69], [70] [69], [70]
TABLE V: Detailed characteristics of standard radio navigational aids.
Instrument Landing System (ILS)
ILS [69] consists of several (typically four) radio trans-
mitters to guide aircraft during approach and landing. The
localizer antenna is centered on the runway beyond its end.
Using amplitude modulation, a 90 Hz and a 150 Hz tone are
sent with directional antennas in two lobes. One lobe is slightly
directed to the left hand of the centerline and one to the right
hand. Thus, a receiver not located on or very close to the front
course line will hear one of the signals louder than the other.
The localizer provides lateral guidance to the aircraft which
keeps flying where both signals are equally loud. Vertical
guidance is provided by the glide scope antenna beside the
runway using the same principle. Along the approach path,
marker beacons may radiate fan-shaped vertical beams at fixed
distances to the runway. The beams modulate Morse code-like
audible tones with different frequencies, which are provided to
the pilot acoustically or visually. The frequency and the Morse
code indicate the distance to the runway. The use of marker
beacons, however, is rare since real estate for installation is a
major problem [70]; DME is usually used as a replacement.
Security Considerations for Radio Navigation Aids: Fig. 5
provides the comparative safety impact of all 5 technologies.
The differences reflect their current use and importance: GPS
and ILS obtain high ratings especially from pilots, DME and
VOR follow with middling ratings across all groups, while the
outdated NDB is considered to be of low impact.
Navigational aids measure physical properties of signals
such as time-difference of arrival (GPS), angle of arrival
(NDB), phase shifts (VOR), signal strength (ILS), or round-trip
time (DME). Neither property nor the signals themselves are
authenticated and can therefore be trivially attacked within the
line of sight. While this has long been achievable by military
actors (see existing literature on electronic warfare, e.g., [27]),
today many attacks on navigational aids can be launched
by less powerful attackers using SDRs. For instance, all
radio frequency-based technologies are inherently susceptible
to jamming attacks. Hence, a DoS attack only requires the
attacker to be able to generate noise such that the signal-to-
noise ratio of legitimate signals at the aircraft drops below the
reception threshold. GPS signals in particular are extremely
weak and easy to attack, a well-known fact in the security
community for many years [73]. In fact, even some participants
experienced failure of their GPS systems due to “large-scale
GPS jamming, presumably local military exercise”.
Spoofing is a more surgical but serious threat to navi-
gational aids. As there is only one victim in most attack
scenarios (the target aircraft), it is feasible using a single
antenna (as shown in [55] for the case of GPS) and portable
implementations of GPS spoofing devices exist [74]. RAIM
does not provide protection, since the attacker can spoof all six
satellites – it is a safety precaution, not a security feature. Such
spoofing attacks are dangerous as they result in a derivation of
a false position by the aircraft, which is much harder to detect
than a DoS. Existing simulators such as the Spirent GSS7700
make it convenient to generate signals in advance which can
be used to spoof a whole track, leading to potentially serious
incidents during GPS-based approaches.
The threat of attacks on navigational aids exists during
all phases of flight. During take-off, approach, landing, and
terminal, ground-based attackers benefit from low altitudes
of aircraft in terms of a lower required transmission power
and line of sight to the victim. However, aircraft in the en-
route airspace are also vulnerable by transmitters on board.
Interestingly, only around 30% of the survey participants
know about lacking data integrity and authenticity checks in
navigation aids, with the exception of NDB which is distrusted
by about 50%. For the other four technologies, about 50%
believe that there is built-in security, a worrying number when
contrasted with the high impact ratings of GPS and ILS.
When considering the security of navigational aids, the
procedural use of these aids must also be taken into account.
In most airspaces in the world, pilots are required to rely on
at least two means of navigation. Pilots usually have even
four or more navigational aids available which they use as
backup and for integrity checking. A typical example described
by one of the respondents is using the aids with degrading
accuracy, i.e., GPS is backed up by VOR/DME, backed up
by visual navigation (in clear weather), then dead reckoning
(i.e., using the inertial system), and lastly NDB. ILS is usually
cross-checked by the pilot with the vertical rate, if the rate
does not match the designated three degree slope, the pilot
abandons the approach. Due to this procedure, an attacker
would have to attack multiple systems simultaneously to avoid
being detected. However, attacking single navigational aids
may still go undetected and/or result in a more complex
situation for the pilot increasing the risk for human failure.
V. ASSESSMENT OF CONCRETE SCENARIOS
To further improve the understanding of insecure wireless
aviation technologies, we transformed some of the previously
discussed hypothetical attacks into concrete scenarios and eval-
uated the respondents’ assessments of the practical impact of
What is the effect if... Surveyedgroup No effect
Minor loss of
situational
awareness
Major loss of
situational
awareness
Full denial of
aviation
service
Don’t
know
1) ...a non-existing target shows up on an air
traffic control radar screen? ATC 16.13% 54.84% 25.81% 0..00% 3.23%
2) ...a non-existing target shows up on a TCAS
screen? Pilots 10.75% 44.09% 31.18% 0.00% 13.98%
3) ...wrong label indications show up on an air
traffic control radar screen (e.g., altitude,
selected altitude, callsign)?
ATC 3.01% 28.31% 54.82% 6.02% 7.83%
4) ...wrong label indications show up on a
TCAS screen (e.g. relative altitude)? Pilots 3.23% 30.11% 51.61% 4.30% 10.75%
5) ...information or whole targets are selectively
missing from an air traffic control radar screen? ATC 6.67% 6.67% 83.33% 3.33% 0.00%
6) ...information or whole targets are selectively
missing from a TCAS screen? Pilots 6.52% 23.91% 48.91% 7.61% 13.04%
7) ...all data is missing from an air traffic
control radar screen system (for example for 10
minutes)?
ATC 3.23% 6.45% 45.16% 45.16% 0.00%
8) ...all data is missing from a TCAS screen
system (for example for 10 minutes)? Pilots 6.52% 27.17% 45.65% 6.52% 14.13%
9) ...the position of an aircraft as shown to its
pilot is incorrect? Pilots 5.38% 22.58% 60.22% 7.53% 4.30%
TABLE VI: Answer distribution for nine hypothetical scenarios as answered by 92 pilots and 31 controllers, respectively.
realistic threats. In nine hypothetical scenarios the respondents
had to rate the impact of air traffic communication technologies
misreporting the current air traffic picture. Note, that this could
happen for different reasons, many of which are not caused
by an attack. We were interested in the impact regardless
of the underlying cause which would typically be abstracted
away for users of these systems. The respondents assessed
these scenarios with five options: “No effect”, “Minor loss of
situational awareness”,9 “Major loss of situational awareness”,
“Full denial of aviation service” and “Don’t know”. Table VI
shows the questions and the distribution of the results.
Some participants would have liked more information as
answers can depend on many specifics. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to cover the large number of potential combinations
of systems and situations separately. Thus, we consider the
quantitative part of the questions about these scenarios as an
abstract expert opinion. Consequently, we complemented all
questions with a qualitative approach by inviting comments,
some of which we provide to gain a more complete picture.
We focus on three systems: ATC radar, showing the air
traffic picture to ground controllers, (Questions 1,3,5,7), TCAS
screens displaying intruders in an aircraft’s immediate airspace
to the pilot (Q2,4,6,8), and navigation aids (Q9). In terms of
attack classes, we analyze message injection (Q1-2), content
manipulation (Q3-4,9), selective jamming (Q5-6), and full DoS
caused by jamming (Q7-8). We report the answers of 92 pilots
to the scenarios relating to their expertise (Q2,4,6,8,9), and of
31 controllers to the scenarios relevant to ATC (Q1,3,5,7).
Comparing the scenarios, we find that the impact of a
single ghost aircraft on a radar screen (Q1) is rated as mostly
“minor”. Controllers say it can cause delays during busy
times due to additional work and increased separation re-
quirements. It is generally common to experience non-existing
radar targets without malicious intent, caused by transponder
issues, reflections, clutter, and other reasons. The impact of
9Situational awareness is a concept widely used in aviation despite some
criticism. A historically accepted definition is “the perception of elements in
the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of
their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” [75].
a ghost aircraft appearing as an intruder on TCAS screens
(Q2) is rated slightly higher, it is seen as likely that it would
trigger unnecessary manoeuvres that could lead to further
unpredictable complications. For both ground radar screens
and pilots’ TCAS displays, wrong label indications are rated
higher in impact compared to ghost aircraft (Q3+4). For both
scenarios, more than 50% consistently rate it as at least a major
loss of situational awareness. While controllers and pilots
might clarify wrong labels via Voice, the participants do rely
on their TCAS data. Selectively missing information is also
rated highly in terms of loss of situational awareness (Q5+6).
Some comments note that it is inherently difficult or impossible
for a pilot or controller to cross-check missing aircraft as they
would not even know about it in many situations, thus no
action happens. For TCAS, it would lose all purpose, and could
have severe impact in bad weather and visibility conditions.
Under non-selective jamming attacks on ATC (Q7), operations
would be stopped for general aviation and commercial starts
and landings would be reduced. All operations would go
procedural and use VHF for communication and separation
(this is not hypothetical as two major incidents last year in
Central Europe proved [3]). For TCAS (Q8), the scenario is
rated very similarly to selectively missing information.
For the last scenario (Q9), we asked for the general effect
in case the instruments of an aircraft show its position to be
different from the true one (e.g., in case of a GPS malfunction,
whether caused deliberately or not). If an incorrect position
of an aircraft is shown to its pilot, major loss of situational
awareness would occur but the specific outcomes are again
impossible to predict. The respondents suggest a wide range
of scenarios, from additional work for the controller up to a
fighter jet escort. One comment noted that German regulations
for controllers state that they should not consider outages or
wrong labels as a possibility in their work but always rely on
the systems (the implication being that otherwise the workload
could not be handled), illustrating technology’s importance.
Attacks Requirements Defenses
Confidentiality Integrity Long-term Short-term
VHF [36] - X - [36], [37], [76]–[79]
PSR [27], [42], [80], [81] - X - [27], [80], [81]
SSR [49], [82] - X [83]–[85] [82], [86]
ADS-B / TIS-B / FIS-B [6], [8], [10], [13], [51], [87] - X [50], [83], [84], [88]–[93] [50]–[52], [56], [58], [86], [94]–[107]
CPDLC [24] X X [24], [85], [108]–[111] -
MLAT [54] - X [112], [113] [50], [112]–[114]
ACARS [10], [13], [62], [115], [116] X X [24], [62], [63], [116]–[118] -
TCAS [8], [119] - X [83], [120] -
GPS [55], [74], [121] - X [122] [55], [74], [121]–[124]
ILS [82] - X - [27], [80]–[82]
VOR / NDB / DME [27], [80], [81] - X - [27], [80], [81]
TABLE VII: Overview of attacks, security requirements, and existing research on securing wireless aviation communication systems.
VI. DIRECTIONS IN AVIATION SECURITY RESEARCH
In this section, we discuss and systematize the work that
has been conducted on the security of the analyzed tech-
nologies. Besides the works discussed in Section IV, we list
in Table VII the vulnerabilities and defense approaches that
have been subject to research in the academic community.
In addition, we broadly systematize the existing research on
countermeasures into two categories:
• Long-term research of secure new technologies: These
works focus on developing secure new technologies and
protocols to be used in aviation communication. Considering
the decade-long development, certification, and deployment
cycles in aviation, this type of research will see applications
only in the long run. The common factor for all such
approaches is that they require changes to current tech-
nologies or aircraft/ground station equipage which renders
them unusable in the short and even medium term. However,
proposals for the ADS-B protocol [50], [88], [89] or TCAS
[83], [120] for instance show potential directions for future
technologies to include security by design, typically using
cryptography to ensure integrity and/or confidentiality.
• Defenses applicable in the short-term: These works rely
on other defense strategies that do not require modifica-
tions of existing infrastructure and protocols. Typical rep-
resentatives of this type of research are separate intrusion
detection mechanisms based on cyber-physical defenses
such as improved localization protocols (e.g., [57]). Also
in this category, we can find works on statistical analysis
[58], machine learning [36], physical-layer security [102]–
[104], or data fusion with backup technologies [100]. The
characteristic shared by these approaches is the fact that they
can be deployed within a small time window. They would
work transparently for aviation users without a costly and
time-consuming overhaul of existing systems.
As both time horizons are crucial to ensure the continued
safety of all services utilizing aviation communication tech-
nologies, we note the absence of some research directions
in Table VII. On both the short-term and the long-term side,
there has been a plethora of research on the relatively newer
ADS-B and its derivative technologies as well as GPS and
SSR. There are no existing academic works, which look at
securing the legacy technologies PSR and the navigational
aids VOR/NDB/DME in the longer term. This can party be
attributed to their lower attack surface and the fact that these
technologies are being phased out in the foreseeable (yet with
10-20 years fairly distant) future. The same is not true for ILS
at many major airports, which will be in use for a very long
time, despite the increasing popularity of GPS-based approach
systems. Thus, the lack of academic security research on ILS
is almost as concerning as it is for VHF, which is also lacking
a successor technology at the present, despite its many obvious
and documented real-world security challenges.
Furthermore, some technologies lack research on near-
term countermeasures that are deployable quickly and without
incurring prohibitive costs. This is most relevant for both data
link options, ACARS and CPDLC, where all works propose
cryptographic measures, with many yet unsolved problems
concerning e.g. available packet size or key distribution and
management in a globalized and heterogeneous aviation en-
vironment [24], [62], [63], [85], [108]–[111], [116]–[118].
Considering the vulnerabilities discussed in Section IV, this
feels like a glaring oversight. Similarly, TCAS is one of
the most safety-critical technologies, yet there is no push to
improve the immediate security of the system.
Going forward, we believe that in the short-term awareness
of the issues at hand is a crucial factor. The necessary research
can only happen with increased awareness of the aviation
system’s vulnerabilities, which would motivate the responsible
bodies to address the problem. One survey comment noted that
regulations are crucial in an industry such as aviation which is
very cost-conscious and that actions were typically taken only
when required by regulators. Tying this in with the point about
awareness, it is clear that the authorities need to be put in a
position to issue the necessary regulations required for the de-
ployment of short-term security improvements and long-term
secure protocols. An example would be the ACARS protocol,
where proprietary cryptography is already used sparsely for
parts of the data link communication. A similar move by more
airlines could improve the security of this technology quickly.
In terms of research challenges, it is crucial that future se-
curity research does not ignore the domain-specific knowledge
and requirements of aviation. It is futile to create long-term
solutions for protocols that will be replaced such as VHF or
SSR. Also, focusing on isolated problems without considering
whole system will inevitably lead to impractical solutions
dismissed by the aviation community. Yet, it is inevitable that
as aviation requires newly developed secure solutions for all
applications, the security community must be involved.
Some of the aviation experts noted a lack of appreciation,
ignorance and complacency surrounding security within their
community. One controller concretely reported a lack of action,
related to unawareness of regulators and cost-saving pressures
in the industry. As one respondent summarized “These ques-
tions are silly. Remember aviation is behind 30 years.”
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we provided a systematic analysis of the
wireless technologies in aviation. Until now, security analyses
of air traffic communication have focused on isolated protocols
and did not consider the aviation systems perspective and
crucial domain knowledge. Capitalizing on the security knowl-
edge from the academic and hacker communities, technology
standards, and the opinions of international aviation experts,
we provided a detailed overview of the technologies and their
vulnerabilities, existing attacks, and potential countermeasures.
We further examine the awareness of the aviation commu-
nity concerning the security of wireless systems and collect
expert opinions on the safety impact of attacks on these
technologies. Our results motivate the need to reassess the risk
of attacks under realistic system models and the development
of appropriate countermeasures for the short and long term.
With our work, we make a first step towards the integration of
the wireless security community and the aviation community.
A systematic awareness of the existing issues is maybe the
most important factor contributing towards safer skies in the
future. With the trend going towards more automated data
networks communication, we strongly believe that aviation
should catch up with the state of the art in wireless security
to maintain its excellent safety record in the future.
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